Malicious MS Word Document analysis – be0efa4c2c6e

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File

Type

Microsoft Office Document

9 malicious · 35 files

DOCbe0efa4c2c6e815b49749a21186f6660MS Word DocumentT1059.005 · ATT&CK T1564.007

XML[Content_Types].xmlextracted from MS Word Document · XML

BIN_rels

BINword

BIN_rels

XMLdocument.xmlextracted from MS Word Document · XML

BINtheme

XMLsettings.xmlextracted from MS Word Document · XML

XMLstylesWithEffects.xmlextracted from MS Word Document · XML

XMLstyles.xmlextracted from MS Word Document · XML

XMLfontTable.xmlextracted from MS Word Document · XML

XMLwebSettings.xmlextracted from MS Word Document · XML

XMLvbaData.xmlextracted from MS Word Document · XML

OFFvbaProject.binextracted from MS Word Document · MS Office Document

BINPROJECTextracted from MS Office Document

BINPROJECTwmextracted from MS Office Document

BINVBA

BINdirextracted from MS Office Document

VBANewMacrossub-stream · VBA ModuleATT&CK T1564.007

VBS[Stored VBA]code extracted · VBScriptATT&CK T1564.007

VBA[PCode]disassembled · VBA ModuleATT&CK T1564.007

VBS[Decompiled VBA]decompiled · VBScriptATT&CK T1564.007

VBS[Full Diff]generated · VBScriptT1059.005 · ATT&CK T1564.007

VBS[Full Diff].deobfuscated.vbsdeobfuscated · VBScriptT1059.005

VBS[Partial Diff]generated · VBScriptATT&CK T1564.007

BIN_VBA_PROJECTextracted from MS Office Document

BINThisDocumentextracted from MS Office Document

BINdocProps

BINcustomXml

URLs in VB Code - #1 URIsuspect

http:/huhuhuhuhuhuhu

URLs in VB Code - #2 URIsuspect

http:huhuhuhuhuhuhu

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9 malicious · 35 files

DOCbe0efa4c2c6e815b49749a21186f6660MS Word DocumentT1059.005 · ATT&CK T1564.007

XML[Content_Types].xmlextracted from MS Word Document · XML

BIN_rels

BINword

BIN_rels

XMLdocument.xmlextracted from MS Word Document · XML

BINtheme

XMLsettings.xmlextracted from MS Word Document · XML

XMLstylesWithEffects.xmlextracted from MS Word Document · XML

XMLstyles.xmlextracted from MS Word Document · XML

XMLfontTable.xmlextracted from MS Word Document · XML

XMLwebSettings.xmlextracted from MS Word Document · XML

XMLvbaData.xmlextracted from MS Word Document · XML

OFFvbaProject.binextracted from MS Word Document · MS Office Document

BINPROJECTextracted from MS Office Document

BINPROJECTwmextracted from MS Office Document

BINVBA

BINdirextracted from MS Office Document

VBANewMacrossub-stream · VBA ModuleATT&CK T1564.007

VBS[Stored VBA]code extracted · VBScriptATT&CK T1564.007

VBA[PCode]disassembled · VBA ModuleATT&CK T1564.007

VBS[Decompiled VBA]decompiled · VBScriptATT&CK T1564.007

VBS[Full Diff]generated · VBScriptT1059.005 · ATT&CK T1564.007

VBS[Full Diff].deobfuscated.vbsdeobfuscated · VBScriptT1059.005

VBS[Partial Diff]generated · VBScriptATT&CK T1564.007

BIN_VBA_PROJECTextracted from MS Office Document

BINThisDocumentextracted from MS Office Document

BINdocProps

BINcustomXml

vbaDNA - VBA Stomping & Purging Stategy detection

	Module Name0
	NewMacros	VBA Stomping ATT&CK T1564.007 Malicious Malicious Document Blacklist VBA VBA Macro
PCode Decompiled VBA Stored VBA Partial Diff. Full Diff. Missing P-Code: The Office document under analysis has been identified as having undergone VBA Purging techniques, as the P-Code block within the document is currently inaccessible. As a result, the decompilation of the code was not possible, leaving only the stored code available in textual format for analysis. VBA Purging essentially involves the elimination of the PerformanceCache section from the module streams. To fully erase any traces of the P-Code section, the MODULEOFFSET between the two sections is adjusted to 0 by altering the _VBA_PROJECT stream, and all SRP streams that also house PerformanceCache data are removed. Following the removal of the compiled code, antivirus engines and Yara rules, which depend on precise string matches, are rendered ineffective. This allows macros to bypass them effortlessly, owing to the compressed format of the remaining source code.

No malware configuration was found at this point.

URLs in VB Code - #1 URIsuspect

http:/huhuhuhuhuhuhu

be0efa4c2c6e815b49749a21186f6660 › word › vbaProject.bin

URLs in VB Code - #2 URIsuspect

http:huhuhuhuhuhuhu

be0efa4c2c6e815b49749a21186f6660 › word › vbaProject.bin

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